In this lecture, we review the key results from the computational tournaments run by Robert Axelrod on the iterated/repeated Prisoner's dilemma game. We re-introduce the Prisoner's dilemma and the puzzle of how cooperation can evolve, identifying the difference between the Nash equilibrium and a socially efficient solution that is not a Nash equilibrium as being the key problem. This lets us talk about resolutions to the problem – including relatedness and compensation. We then discuss how iterating the Prisoner's Dilemma introduces temporal relatedness, and how placing the Prisoner's Dilemma on a grid introduces network relatedness. After mentioning how punishment can also be used to maintain cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games, we open the topic of how the Prisoner's Dilemma may be unrealistic and other games might be better/more useful models, particularly when it comes to natural resources and sustainability. We close with a brief introduction to the Stag Hunt coordination game, which we will pick up on next time (as well as introduce the Hawk–Dove game, which is a better model for the tragedy of the commons than the Prisoner's Dilemma).
Whiteboard notes for this lecture can be found at: https://www.dropbox.com/s/l1vt0uwvltfm40k/SOS220-LectureH2-2023-04-11-Game_Theoretic_Models_of_Social_Interactions-Part_1.pdf?dl=0
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